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I. INTRODUCTION 
On a bright summer day in July 2011, a helicopter hummed through a blue 
sky over the treetops in Tehama County, California.1 Below the helicopter, 
narcotics agents armed with guns and machetes tore apart a large-scale marijuana 
plantation, which contained thousands of marijuana plants.2 The agents were 
participating in a tradition for California law enforcement: the summertime 
eradication of millions of marijuana plants.3 Yet, in the fiscal year of 2010 to 
2011, the state issued over ten-thousand medical marijuana cards that allow 
cardholders to grow and use marijuana legally.4 
If asked whether marijuana cultivation is legal in California, an attorney will 
likely answer with the lawyer’s standard refrain, “it depends.”5 Section 11358 of 
the California Health and Safety Code establishes that cultivating marijuana is a 
felony,6 but the law regarding cultivation is not so simple.7 In 1996, California 
voters passed Proposition 215, known as the Compassionate Use Act (CUA).8 
 
1. See Zusha Elinson, Budget Cuts Endanger State’s Marijuana Eradication Program, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/us/29bccamp.html?pagewanted=all (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review) (indicating that the raid occurred on Wednesday of the same week that the article was published). 
2. Id. 
3. See id. (stating that the Campaign Against Marijuana Planting is a “predictable rite of summer” that 
deploys law enforcement agents to cut marijuana crops). 
4. California Medical Marijuana Identification Card By Volume, By County, CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. 
HEALTH (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/MMP/Documents/MMP%20County%20FY%20 
Card%20Count.FY2010_11.pdf%20May%2017.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 11362.775 (West 2007). 
5. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11358 (West 2007 & Supp. 2013) (stating that cultivating 
marijuana in California is a felony). But see id. § 11362.5 (West 2007) (codifying the Compassionate Use Act, 
which created an affirmative defense to felony charges of marijuana cultivation). Both possession and 
cultivation are illegal under federal law. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), (b)(5) (2006). 
6. See HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358 (stating that people that are convicted of cultivating marijuana serve 
their sentences in prison). 
7. See infra note 17 and accompanying text (exploring the state of marijuana law in California).  
8. HEALTH & SAFETY§ 11362.5 (West 2007). 
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The CUA9 created an affirmative defense to the felony charge of cultivating 
marijuana.10 Thus, a person who is charged with cultivating marijuana may be 
acquitted under the CUA.11 Medical marijuana legislation followed the CUA.12 
In 2003, the California Legislature created the Medical Marijuana Program 
(MMP).13 Unlike the CUA, the MMP offers immunity from arrest, but conditions 
that immunity on the number of plants that a person may possess or cultivate.14 
Thus, even though section 11358 establishes that cultivating marijuana is a 
felony,15 a person can grow limited amounts of marijuana without fear of arrest or 
criminal charges.16 These apparently conflicting laws have created a confusing 
legal environment where cultivating marijuana is a felony under most 
circumstances, but is legal under some circumstances.17 In this confusion, three 
distinguishable categories of marijuana cultivators have emerged: legal 
cultivators, lesser illegal cultivators, and major illegal cultivators.18 This 
Comment does not discuss the legal cultivators that the CUA and MMP protect. 
Lesser illegal cultivators grow small amounts of marijuana, generally on private 
property, sometimes for personal use; major illegal cultivators grow large 
amounts of marijuana, often on public land for the purpose of sale.19 The 
cultivation statute, however, does not differentiate between the two types of 
illegal cultivators.20 
 
9. California voters passed the CUA (Proposition 215) with 55.58% of the vote. Michelle Patton, The 
Legalization of Marijuana: A Dead-End or the High Road to Fiscal Solvency?, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 163, 
166 (2010) (citing BILL JONES, SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 5, 1996, at viii 
(1996)). 
10. See HEALTH & SAFETY § 11362.5 (stating that Section 11358 of the Health and Safety Code does 
not apply to patients who cultivate marijuana and have physician approval to use it). 
11. Id. 
12. Medical Marijuana Program Act, 2003 Cal. Stat. ch. 875 (enacting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 
11362.77). 
13. Id. 
14. Compare id. (offering immunity from arrest when a person has a limited number of plants), with 
HEALTH & SAFETY § 11362.5 (stating that Section 11358 of the Health and Safety Code does not apply to 
patients who cultivate medical marijuana and have physician approval to use it, but not offering immunity from 
arrest).  
15. See HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358 (West 2007 & Supp. 2013) (stating that people who are convicted of 
cultivating marijuana serve their sentences in prison). 
16. See id. § 11362.77 (West 2007) (allowing patients to possess up to six full-grown marijuana plants). 
17. See Gerald Caplan, Symposium: Medical Marijuana: A Study of Unintended Consequences, 43 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 127, 127 (2012) (“The legal status of medical marijuana is a legislative oddity, perhaps 
unprecedented, in that state governments authorize possession and use of marijuana in knowing and clear 
violation of federal criminal law.”). 
18. These are the author’s own designations. The distinguishing characteristics will be discussed infra in 
Parts III and IV. 
19. This is a general distinction without clearly defined lines between lesser and major offenders. It 
might be useful to consider a “large amount” of marijuana to be like obscenity in that it would be difficult to 
define but a judge would know it when he or she saw it. 
20. See HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358 (West 2007 & Supp. 2013) (stating that a person who cultivates 
marijuana must serve a sentence in prison regardless of the amount of marijuana cultivated). 
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Even though public opinion has shifted in support of medical marijuana, and 
the law reflects this in many cases, the unlawful cultivation statute has remained 
inflexible.21 Consider the following hypothetical, which demonstrates the 
statute’s inflexibility: a college student who is not a qualified patient under the 
CUA or MMP is caught growing five marijuana plants in his closet. At the same 
time, a person employed by a drug cartel and not a qualified patient under the 
CUA or MMP is caught growing five-thousand marijuana plants on public land. 
If charged, both face the same charge and potential punishment under section 
11358 of the Health and Safety Code.22 
This Comment questions the wisdom of such an inflexible law in light of the 
legal status of marijuana, the increased social acceptance of medical use of 
marijuana, and the increasing problem of large-scale plantations in California. It 
first argues that the legislature should amend the cultivation statute to become a 
“wobbler”—a punishment scheme allowing the crime to be charged as either a 
felony or misdemeanor,23 instead of a “straight felony,”24—a felony statute not 
allowing for a misdemeanor charge and then recommends harsher sentences for 
more egregious offenses.25 This two-pronged solution will give prosecutors 
flexibility when they decide what charges to file, while giving courts flexible 
sentencing guidelines. It will also account for the varied legal status of marijuana, 
the increased social acceptance of the drug for medical purposes, and the 
growing problem of large-scale plantations in California. Part II provides an 
overview of California’s marijuana laws and notes how the cultivation statute has 
not changed despite significant shifts in related areas of the law.  
In Part III, this Comment discusses a partial solution to the problem of the 
inflexible statute in light of social and legal change.26 This Part focuses first on 
Assembly Bill (AB) 1017, introduced in 2011, which would have amended 
section 11358 of the California Health and Safety Code, making the statute an 
alternative felony misdemeanor, or “wobbler,” instead of a “straight felony.”27 
 
21. See infra Part II (exploring the relatively static history of the unlawful cultivation statute). 
22. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358 (stating that a person who cultivates marijuana must serve a sentence in 
prison regardless of the amount of marijuana that they cultivate). In a real-life situation, the actual time served 
may be different based on various enhancements, such as the presence of a firearm, prior convictions, and 
further charges under possession for sale, which would have to be charged separately under Section 11359 of 
the California Health and Safety Code; all things being equal, however, Section 11358 would apply the exact 
same way. Id. 
23. See infra notes 129–33 and accompanying text (discussing AB 1017 and its likely effects had it been 
passed). 
24. Id. 
25. See Beckway v. DeShong, 717 F. Supp. 2d 908, 920 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (indicating that in criminal 
law jargon, the offenses that a prosecutor can charge as either felonies or misdemeanors are known as 
“wobblers”). 
26. See infra Part III (discussing AB 1017 and the benefits it might have provided had it passed). 
27. AB 1017, 2011 Leg., 2011–2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011) (as introduced on February 18, 2011, but not 
enacted). See infra notes 129–33 and accompanying text (discussing AB 1017 and the effect it would have had 
on the unlawful cultivation statute’s sentencing formula). 
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Part III looks at the benefits and costs of wobbler statutes. While the unlawful 
cultivation statute should be a wobbler, this Comment further argues that AB 
1017 was an incomplete solution to a larger problem.28 
Part IV explores why AB 1017 was an incomplete solution. This Part also 
examines California’s experience with large-scale marijuana operations, focusing 
on public safety and environmental dangers. Part IV then discusses how an 
amended unlawful cultivation statute could deal with these kinds of problems. 
Part V of this Comment proposes a new cultivation statute for California, 
which would allow prosecutors and judges discretion to enforce community 
standards while simultaneously tackling the rampant, large-scale grow operations 
in California.29 
II. ROOTS OF UNLAWFUL CULTIVATION 
This Part first defines unlawful cultivation and distinguishes it from the more 
serious offense of manufacturing.30 It then explores how the unlawful cultivation 
statute has remained static and inflexible in comparison to other aspects of 
marijuana law, and illustrates some of the confusion resulting from recent 
developments in marijuana law.31 Finally, this Part identifies various problems 
that arise from the unchanged law concerning cultivation in the evolving field of 
marijuana law.32 
A. Defining and Distinguishing Unlawful Cultivation 
The unlawful cultivation statute contains several elements, any of which may 
trigger an arrest: planting, cultivating, harvesting, drying, or processing.33 
California’s Fourth District Court of Appeal has held that control over land on 
which marijuana plants are growing creates an inference of cultivation.34 The 
 
28. See infra notes 129–35 and accompanying text (concluding that AB 1017 was an incomplete 
solution to a larger problem). 
29. Id. 
30. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11358 (West 2007 & Supp. 2013) (stating that convicted 
cultivators will serve time in state prison); id. § 11379.6 (stating that convicted manufacturers will serve time in 
prison and pay a fine); infra Part II.A (discussing the construction of the cultivation statute).  
31. See infra Part II.B–C (discussing some of the confusion that has arisen due to the current statutory 
framework). 
32. See infra Part II.D (discussing these problems). 
33. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358. 
34. See California v. Vermouth, 116 Cal. Rptr. 675, 681 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1974) (“We also conclude 
proof the marijuana plants were growing on the sun deck of the residence, coupled with evidence defendants 
had control of the premises, was sufficient to support their conviction of cultivating marijuana.”). Vermouth is 
the only published appellate decision on this point of law to date; however, it has been cited by a number of 
unpublished cases. See, e.g., People v. Holland, 23 Cal. 3d 77, 87 (1978) (citing to Vermouth without 
commenting on the Fourth District’s holding that control of the premises coupled with the presence of 
marijuana plants was sufficient to convict for unlawful marijuana cultivation) (disagreed with on other 
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“processing” element of section 11358 of the Health and Safety Code widens the 
scope of the crime.35 In California v. Tierce, the Fifth District Court of Appeal 
held that a person “who removes the leaves from marijuana plants in order to 
render the leaves usable for smoking is engaged in processing the drug and thus 
violates . . . section 11358.”36 
According to the unlawful cultivation statute, processing marijuana is 
distinguishable from a more serious type of processing known as 
manufacturing.37 While unlawful cultivation includes activities as simple as 
trimming and preparing marijuana, it does not include the more complex 
chemical processing found in section 11379.6 of the Health and Safety Code.38  
Section 11379.6 covers “every person who manufactures, compounds, 
converts, produces, derives, processes, or prepares [marijuana], either directly or 
indirectly by chemical extraction or independently by means of chemical 
synthesis. . . .”39 
There are three noteworthy differences between sections 11358 and 
11379.6.40 First, section 11379.6 includes a more specific category of activities, 
focusing on the chemical process.41 That is, section 11379.6 includes words like 
“manufacture” and “extraction,” whereas “processing” in section 11358 applies 
to activities such as trimming plants and preparing leaves for smoking.42 Second, 
the purpose of section 11379.6 focuses on the means of processing the drugs.43 
Unlike the unlawful cultivation statute, the purpose of section 11379.6 is to 
protect the public from the potentially hazardous production process that involves 
 
grounds); California v. Arbacauskas, 123 Cal. App. 4th 502, 862 (Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2004) (finding sufficient 
evidence for conviction for marijuana cultivation based on the satisfaction of the elements of cultivation in 
Vermouth); California v. Sivichith, 2003 WL 549406 at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th Dist. Feb. 26, 2003) (stating that a 
person’s physical presence on the property or cohabitation with the owner does not amount to the kind of 
control over land required to be sufficient evidence of marijuana cultivation under the standard in Vermouth); 
California v. Haylock, 2009 WL 1026892 at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Apr. 17, 2009) (finding that because the 
defendant had control over the property where marijuana plants were growing, there was sufficient evidence to 
find that the defendant was cultivating marijuana).  
35. See California v. Tierce, 211 Cal. Rptr. 325, 333 (Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1985) (stating that removing a 
marijuana plant’s leaves in order to smoke them is a form of processing). 
36. Id. 
37. Compare HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358 (stating that convicted cultivators will serve time in prison), 
with id. § 11379.6 (stating that convicted manufacturers will serve time in prison and pay a fine). 
38. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358; see also Tierce, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 333 (stating that removing the leaves 
of a marijuana plant constitutes processing according to the unlawful cultivation statute). 
39. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11379.6. 
40. See infra notes 41–46 and accompanying text (demonstrating the various differences between Penal 
Code sections 11358 and 11379.6). 
41. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11379.6; see also id. § 11358 (encompassing a broad range of activities).  
42. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11379.6; see also Tierce, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 332–3 (discussing whether 
removing leaves from marijuana plants constitutes processing marijuana). 
43. See California v. Bergen, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 577, 585 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2008) (“[T]he Legislature 
intended section 11379.6(a) to apply to . . . concentrated cannabis when produced through chemical 
extraction.”).  
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chemical extraction.44 Third, the punishment for chemical processing is more 
severe.45 Section 11379.6 carries a punishment of three, five, or seven years, and 
a fine of up to fifty-thousand dollars.46 
Section 11358 therefore does not generally represent the type of dangerous 
conduct associated with drug production labs, like processing volatile 
chemicals.47 The reach of the cultivation statute is limited to conduct such as 
planting the seeds, watering and maintaining the plants, and drying and trimming 
the plants to ready them for use.48 That has not changed substantively in forty 
years.49 
B. Unlawful Cultivation Before and After Determinate Sentencing 
In 1968, before the California Determinate Sentencing Act (CDSA), the 
legislature enacted section 11530.1 of the Health and Safety Code, which 
criminalized marijuana cultivation.50 The statute designated unlawful cultivation 
of marijuana as a felony, but followed an indeterminate sentencing scheme.51 By 
the early 1970s, the indeterminate sentencing scheme had begun to break down,52 
and in 1975, the California Supreme Court recognized the difficulty of reviewing 
indeterminate sentences.53 In 1976, the legislature passed Senate Bill (SB) 42,54 
the CDSA, a complex piece of legislation.55 The CDSA was a milestone in 
California sentencing history, changing the sentencing paradigm applied 
throughout the state.56 
 
44. Id.; see also HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358 (encompassing a broad range of activities). 
45. Compare HEALTH & SAFETY § 11379.6 (stating that convicted manufacturers will serve time in 
prison and pay a fine), with id. § 11358 (stating that convicted cultivators will serve time in prison and pay a 
fine). 
46. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11379.6. 
47. See Bergen, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 585 (“[T]he Legislature intended section 11379.6(a) to apply to . . . 
concentrated cannabis when produced through chemical extraction.”); Tierce, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 333 (stating that 
removing the leaves of a marijuana plant constitutes processing according to the unlawful cultivation statute). 
48. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358; see also Tierce, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 332–3 (concluding that removing the 
leaves from marijuana constitutes processing). 
49. See infra Part II.B (discussing the history of the unlawful cultivation statute). 
50. See 1968 Cal. Stat. ch. 1465 § 2, at 2931–32 (enacting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11530.1) (stating 
that violatins of the 1968 version of the unlawful cultivation were punishable by time in state prison for between 
one and ten years); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11530.1 (repealed in 1972, redesignated as CAL. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE § 11358).  
51. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11530.1 (repealed 1972, redesignated as HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358). 
52. April Kestell Cassou & Brian Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California: The New Numbers 
Game, 9 PACIFIC L.J. 5, 9–10 (1978). 
53. Id. at 15. 
54. Id. at 17. 
55. California Determinate Sentencing Act, 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1139. 
56. Cassou & Taugher, supra note 52, at 6. 
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The CDSA changed the form of the unlawful cultivation statute, but it 
remained a felony.57 While the CDSA did not change the sentences for 
misdemeanors or “alternative dispositions for felonies, such as probation,”58 it 
eliminated the sentencing guidelines that had previously existed in the unlawful 
cultivation statute.59 The elimination of the sentencing guidelines shortened the 
law to its current form60: “Every person who plants, cultivates, harvests, dries, or 
processes any marijuana or any part thereof, except as otherwise provided by 
law, shall be punished by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of section 
1170 of the Penal Code.”61 
C. The Current Legal Landscape 
Section 11358 of the Health and Safety Code includes the phrase “except as 
otherwise provided by law,” which brings to mind the marijuana legislation of 
the past two decades.62 Commentators have exhaustively discussed the last fifteen 
years of marijuana initiatives and legislation in California.63 There are major 
areas of focus in common in each account: the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 
(CUA), the Medical Marijuana Program Act of 2003 (MMP), and the current 
confusion concerning the future of marijuana law.64 This Part provides a brief 
history of the CUA and the MMP, but the focus is on the overall trend toward 
lenience. 
 
57. Id. at 22 (noting the various portions of the law that changed); see also California Determinate 
Sentencing Act, 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1139 § 72, 5082 (amending HEALTH & SAFETY § 11530.1) (renumbering 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11530.1 as CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358 and removing the indeterminate 
sentencing range). 
58. Id. 
59. See California Determinate Sentencing Act, 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1139, §§1–358, 5062–5178 
(replacing the sentencing criteria that had previously existed in the state with new, determinate sentences for 
violating numerous code sections). 
60. Section 11358 of the California Health & Safety Code actually did not reference subdivision (h) of 
section 1170 of the Penal Code. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11358 (West 2007 & Supp. 2013). Although 
the newest version of the statute references a different code section, it remains a felony conviction. Id. 
61. Id. This is the more recent equivalent to the statute, which originally only referred to time in state 
prison, rather than “subdivision (h) of Section 1170.” Id. § 11358 (West 2007). 
62. E.g., Cal. Proposition 215 (1996) (enacting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5) (comprising 
the CUA, which is a provision of law that may cut off criminal liability for cultivating marijuana); Medical 
Marijuana Program Act, 2003 Cal. Stat. ch. 875 (establishing the Medical Marijuana Program, which may cut 
off criminal liability for cultivating marijuana if the cultivator remains within certain guidelines). 
63. E.g., Patton, supra note 9 (discussing the financial implications of legalizing marijuana); Michael 
Berkey, Mary Jane’s New Dance: The Medical Marijuana Legal Tango, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 
417, 428–33 (2011) (discussing the federal response to various state’s marijuana legalization); Robert Weisberg, 
Symposium, The Road to Legitimizing Marijuana: What Benefit at What Cost?, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 
(2012) (listing various topics related to marijuana laws). 
64. Patton, supra note 9, at 166; Chris Lindberg, Room for Abuse: A Critical Analysis of the Legal 
Justification for the Marijuana Storefront “Dispensary”, 40 SW. L. REV. 59 (2010). 
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1. The Compassionate Use Act: The Seeds of Leniency and Budding 
Confusion 
California voters passed the CUA by initiative in 1996.65 In the Voter 
Information Guide to the 1996 General Election, proponents of Proposition 215 
argued that the proposition would help terminally ill patients and that marijuana 
would still be illegal for non-medical use.66 The language of the proposition, 
however, was not so restrictive.67 The CUA, outlined in section 11362.5 of the 
Health and Safety Code, included the catch-all phrase “any other illness for 
which marijuana provides relief” for those who did not suffer from the 
enumerated ailments.68 The CUA’s language caused confusion.69 
In California v. Spark, the California Court of Appeal for the Fifth District 
held that the CUA was not restricted to the “seriously ill” patients mentioned in 
the language of the statute.70 It held that “seriously ill” was only prefatory 
language, and it referred only to the specific diseases following immediately after 
in the same subsection.71 The court reasoned that whether marijuana is an 
appropriate treatment is a question for a physician to answer.72 It further held that 
it was not up to a jury to decide whether a defendant asserting a CUA defense 
was seriously ill.73 This determination was for a physician to make, and jurors 
could not "second-guess" that decision.74Although jurors have no say on the 
efficacy of a physician’s determination, that fact does not protect cultivators from 
arrest.75 
 
65. Cal. Proposition 215 (1996) (enacting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5). 
66. Richard J. Cohen, et. al., Argument in Favor of Proposition 215, in 1996 CALIFORNIA GENERAL 
ELECTION VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE/BALLOT PAMPHLET 60 (1996). 
67. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West 2007) (stating that a doctor can 
prescribe marijuana for certain enumerated illnesses and “any other illness for which marijuana provides 
relief”). 
68. Id. 
69. Tammy L. McCabe, It’s High Time: California Attempts to Clear the Smoke Surrounding the 
Compassionate Use Act, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 545, 545 (2004) (“Since its enactment, uncertainties in the 
[Compassionate Use] Act have become manifest, impeding law enforcement's ability to interpret and enforce 
the law.”); see also, e.g., California v. Wright, 40 Cal. 4th 81, 84–5 (2006) (exploring how the MMPA 
retroactively affected cases in which defendants could not argue the CUA defense because they had been 
convicted of transporting marijuana, and not of growing or using it); California v. Mower, 28 Cal. 4th 457, 467 
(2002) (discussing whether the CUA constitutes immunity from arrest and prosecution or only constitutes an 
affirmative defense). 





75. Id.; see also California v. Kelly, 222 P.3d 186, 188 (Cal. 2010) (citing California v. Mower, 49 P.3d 
1067, 1074–76 (Cal. 2002)) (“The CUA does not grant immunity from arrest for [marijuana possession] . . . .”).  
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2. The Road to the Medical Marijuana Program 
Efforts to clarify, extend, or implement the CUA initially met resistance.76 In 
1999, the California Assembly failed to pass SB 848, which would have 
“direct[ed] the state to develop and implement a plan for the safe and affordable 
distribution of medical marijuana.” 77 In 2001, SB 187 would have directed the 
creation of a similar plan had it passed.78 SB 187 did not pass.79 In 2002, the 
California Supreme Court held that the CUA “renders possession and cultivation 
of marijuana noncriminal,” but that the CUA is only a defense in court and does 
not protect patients or caregivers from arrest on marijuana cultivation charges.80 
Problems with the CUA persisted, including decreased availability of 
marijuana for qualified patients, its construction with federal law, and “needless” 
arrests and prosecutions.81 Confusion abounded regarding the legality of 
marijuana use, possession, and cultivation.82 In 2003, SB 187 (2001) was revived 
as SB 420.83 
 
76. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 420, at 8 (Cal. July 
1, 2003) (stating the federal authorities tried to close local marijuana distributors). 
77. SENATE THIRD READING, SUMMARY OF SB 848, at 2 (Cal. Aug. 29, 2000); BILL HISTORY OF SB 
848, (Nov. 30, 2000), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/99-00/bill/sen/sb_0801-0850/sb_848_bill 
_20001130_history.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
78. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, UNFINISHED BUSINESS, SB 187, at 2 (Cal. Sept. 12, 2001). 
79. BILL HISTORY, supra note 76. 
80. Mower, 49 P.3d at 1074–76. Ironically, the court relied on the language of the proponents of the 
CUA found in the Voter Information Guide to limit the CUA. Id. at 1075–76. 
81. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 420, at 12 (Cal. Jul. 1, 
2003) (“Due to vague guidelines, patients and physicians have been subject to needless arrest and prosecution.”) 
82. Thomas Elias, Marijuana Barely Illegal Now: Prop 215 Has Caused Complete Confusion, LODI 
NEWS SENTINEL, Apr. 29, 1997, at 4, available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=hsM0AAAAIBA 
J&sjid=SSEGAAAAIBAJ&pg=5454,7400745 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Medicinal Marijuana 
Law Needs Some Tightening, LODI NEWS SENTINEL, July 17, 2000, at 5, available at http://news.google. 
com/newspapers?id=hbM0AAAAIBAJ&sjid=OiEGAAAAIBAJ&pg=5296,1983746&dq=marijuana+confusion
s+law&hl=en (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“California’s groundbreaking medicinal marijuana law 
is being used in other states as a model of how not to write a law to allow chronically ill patients to smoke the 
drug.”); see also San Francisco Might Plant Its Own Marijuana Garden, UNION DEMOCRAT, July 24, 2002, at 
5A, available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=sy5ZAAAAIBAJ&sjid=Y0cNAAAAIBAJ&pg= 
2215,3047262&dq=marijuana+identification+card&hl=en (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(documenting San Francisco’s own attempts to make marijuana available to users under the CUA model). 
83. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 420, at 12 (Cal. July 1, 
2003). The number 420, also expressed as 4:20 (time) and 4/20 (date), is associated with recreational marijuana 
use. Ryan Grim, 420 Meaning: The True Story of How April 20 Became ‘Weed Day’, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 
20, 2010, 1:32 AM), http://www.huffington post.com/2010/04/20/420-meaning-the-true-stor_n_543854.html 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). For an interesting look at its history and use, see id. 
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3. The Medical Marijuana Program: A Failed Attempt to Clear the Haze 
In 2003, the California Legislature passed SB 420, known as the MMP.84 
According to the Bill’s author, the MMP came as the result of a task force 
convened by then-Attorney General Bill Lockyer.85 The California Department of 
Public Health’s website states that the MMP was enacted to clarify and expand 
the CUA.86 
The MMP created a voluntary identification system and outlined standards 
for “qualified patient” status.87 The MMP extended the CUA by providing 
immunity from arrest by police, but only for those who adhered to the qualified 
patient standards.88 For instance, section 11362.77 of the Health and Safety Code, 
which constitutes the MMP, states that “[a] qualified patient or primary caregiver 
may also maintain no more than six mature or 12 immature marijuana plants per 
qualified patient.”89 This limitation is not absolute, however, as section 
11362.77(c) allows counties to increase the amounts previously listed.90 While 
the CUA and MMP provide immunity for cultivating marijuana, neither has 
affected how section 11358 applies to individuals other than qualified patients.91 
Other statutes have also evolved to reflect public opinion.92 On January 1, 
2011, then-Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed into law SB 1449, which 
amended section 11357 of the Health and Safety Code regarding the possession 
of marijuana.93 SB 1449 changed possession of 28.5 grams or less of marijuana 
from a misdemeanor to an infraction.94 Thus, while the law grants immunity to 
 
84. 2003 Cal. Stat. ch. 875 (enacting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11362.7, 11362.71, 11362.715, 
11362.72, 11362.735, 11362.74, 11362.745, 11362.755, 11362.76, 11362.765, 11362.77, 11362.775, 11362.78, 
11362.785, 11362.79, 11362.795, 11362.8, 11362.81, 11362.82, 11362.83).  
85. SENATE HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 420, at 6 (Cal. 
Apr. 9, 2003). 
86. See Medical Marijuana Program, CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, http://www.cdph.ca.gov/ 
PROGRAMS/mmp/Pages/default.aspx (last updated Jan. 8, 2013, 9:42 AM) (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (stating that the MMP was enacted to address problems with the CUA and also to create a program to 
give identification cards to qualified patients). 
87. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11362.7(f) (West 2007). 
88. See id. § 11362.77 (“A qualified patient or primary caregiver may possess no more than eight ounces 
of dried marijuana per qualified patient . . . [and] no more than six mature or 12 immature marijuana plants per 
qualified patent.”). 
89. Id. § 11362.77(a). 
90. Id. § 11362.77(c). To make matters more confusing, several counties use the name “Medical 
Marijuana Program” for their own county-wide programs. Medical Marijuana Program Frequently Asked 
Questions, CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, http://www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/MMP/Pages/ MMPFAQ.aspx (last 
modified Nov. 14, 2012, 9:59 AM) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
91. See HEALTH & SAFETY § 11362.715 (detailing how a person gains access to the MMP protections); 
id. § 11362.5(b)(1)(a) (outlining generally the types of people to whom the CUA applies). But see id. § 11358 
(providing no explicit exception except the phrase “except as otherwise provided by law.”). 
92. 2010 Cal. Stat. ch. 708 (amending HEALTH & SAFETY § 11357). 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
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qualified patients for cultivating marijuana and penalties for non-medical 
possession have become more lenient, section 11358 does not reflect similar 
change.95 This discrepancy contributes to the claim that California’s marijuana 
law is in a state of chaos.96 
D. A Growing Problem: Mandatory Felony Charge for Lesser Offenses 
Given the decriminalized status of cultivation in the context of the CUA97 and 
the MMP,98 as well as the lowered sentence for non-medical possession of a small 
amount of marijuana,99 Section 11358 of the Health and Safety Code provides a 
hefty and inflexible felony sentence.100 A mandatory felony charge for lesser 
offenders is a problem because it lowers the chances of successful prosecution 
and negatively affects public opinion of the legal system.101 
1. Cost Versus Benefit: A Victory for Lesser Offenders 
Mandatory felony charges for lesser offenses decrease the likelihood of 
successful prosecution.102 People weigh possible outcomes in terms of cost versus 
benefit when engaging in any activity, be it crossing the street or playing the 
lottery.103 In the context of unlawful cultivation of marijuana, cultivators weigh 
the chances of getting caught and convicted against any benefits that they reap 
from cultivating marijuana.104 This is a problem because “criminals prefer a small 
chance of a big punishment to a big chance of a small punishment.”105 Thus, in 
the context of crime, it is “better to double the odds of conviction than to double 
 
95. HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 11362.77, 11358. 
96. See Michael Vitiello, Symposium, Why the Initiative Process Is the Wrong Way to Go: Lessons We 
Should Have Learned from Proposition 215, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 63, 72 (2012) (detailing the confusion 
resulting from the two programs in light of federal laws). 
97. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11362.5(b). 
98. Id. § 11362.77. 
99. Id. § 11357. 
100. Id. § 11358. 
101. See infra Part II.D.1 (discussing these arguments). 
102. See Steven E. Landsburg, Does Crime Pay?, SLATE (Dec. 9, 1999, 3:30 AM), http://www.slate. 
com/articles/arts/everyday_economics/1999/12/does_crime_pay.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(explaining that criminals prefer a low chance of a higher sentence to a high chance of a lower sentence); see 
also Oren Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal-Ayal, Plea Bargains Only for the Guilty, 49 J.L. & ECON. 353, 354 (2006) 
(focusing on the fact that prosecutors can increase plea bargains even in situations where the defendant is 
innocent). While that article deals with plea bargains for innocent defendants, the same principle would seem to 
apply to guilty defendants who have a low chance of successful conviction. Id. Defendants with a higher chance 
of acquittal and much to lose will take their chances. Id. When the odds are evened—when prosecutors have 
discretion to provide lower sentences—the defendant will likely be more willing to accept a plea. Id.  
103. See Landsberg, supra note 102 (using the lottery as an example of the average person’s cost-benefit 
analysis). 
104. See id. (applying the same cost-benefit reasoning to criminal activities). 
105. Id. 
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the severity of the punishment.”106 This point becomes more poignant in the 
context of plea bargains.107 
In order to obtain convictions in the form of plea bargains, prosecutors rely 
on their ability to offer a more favorable outcome to the defendant.108 In plea 
bargaining, or the process of convincing the defendant to plead guilty in 
exchange for lesser charges or penalties, prosecutors employ both the “carrot” 
and the “stick.” The carrot represents a guaranteed lower sentence, and the stick 
is the possibility of a higher sentence if the defendant loses at trial.109 In the case 
of marijuana cultivation, prosecutors are not allowed to offer a misdemeanor 
cultivation charge in exchange for a guilty plea.110 That is, prosecutors have no 
“carrot” to offer the defendant.111 
The fact that defendants can potentially employ the CUA affirmative defense 
makes matters more difficult for prosecutors seeking plea bargains.112 Plea 
bargains are the most common means of obtaining convictions in the United 
States.113 Under current law, a defendant would weigh any deal that the 
prosecutor offers against the likelihood that they will prevail under the CUA, 
which sweeps broadly.114 Given a defendant’s lack of incentive to plead guilty to 
a “straight felony” and the presence of an arguable affirmative defense, plea 
bargains will be more difficult to obtain in light of a CUA affirmative defense.115 
 
106. Id. 
107. See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal-Ayal, Plea Bargains Only for the Guilty, 49 J.L. & 
ECON. 353, 354 (2006) (focusing on the fact that prosecutors can increase plea bargains even in situations 
where the defendant is innocent). 
108. See id. (explaining that broader prosecutorial discretion to offer lower sentences has a positive 
correlation to the number of plea bargains that can be obtained in cases where the defendant has a higher chance 
of acquittal). 
109. See generally id. at 355 (providing an analysis of how defendants approach plea bargains). 
110. See generally NEIL P. COHEN ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE POST-INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS 
352–412 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing the general legal framework surrounding the plea bargaining process). 
Prosecutors may not offer a lower sentence than is legally required by law. Id. Any plea bargain a prosecutor 
offered would have to be lowered by peripheral concerns like dismissing other pending charges in exchange for 
the plea. Id. 
111. COHEN ET. AL., supra note 110. In general, prosecutors will turn to any other charges, such as 
possession for sale, or just possession in order to secure some kind of plea bargain. Id. Without charging those 
extra offenses, there is no way to reduce Section 11358 to a misdemeanor. Id.; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 11358 (West 2007). 
112. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358; see also supra notes 68 and accompanying text (discussing the CUA’s 
catch-all provision, which may include people who do not suffer from serious illness). 
113. See Bar-Gill & Gazal-Ayal, supra note 107, at 353 (“About 95 percent of all convictions in the 
United States are secured with a guilty plea, most of them through plea bargaining.”). 
114. See generally California v. Kelly, 222 P.3d 186, 188 (Cal. 2010) (“[T]he CUA provides an 
affirmative defense to prosecution for the crimes of possession and cultivation.” (emphasis omitted)). 
115. See id. (explaining that the CUA could not be limited by the requirements of the MMPA, and was 
therefore still available to eligible defendants who did not qualify for protection under the MMPA); HEALTH & 
SAFETY § 11358. The terms “straight felony” and “wobbler” do not appear in statutory language, but the a 
wobbler is a crime that is punishable either by time in state prison or pursuant to California Penal Code Section 
1170(h), which are felony sentences, or in the alternative, by up to one year in the county jail, a misdemeanor 
_09_STARR_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2014 9:44 AM 
2013 / The Carrot and the Stick 
1082 
To make matters worse, prosecutors are dealing with a public that does not 
necessarily associate cultivation of modest amounts of marijuana with criminal 
behavior116 and the defendant’s own sense of fairness could make obtaining a plea 
even more difficult.117 
2. The Pen Versus the Sword: A Net Loss for the Justice System 
Charging lesser offenders with a straight felony has negative consequences 
for the justice system.118 The heated debate concerning California’s marijuana 
policy is becoming broader.119 The California Department of Public Health 
website lists three patient advocacy groups as sources of information about 
marijuana and the law: Americans for Safe Access (ASA), CA NORML (CAN), 
and the Marijuana Policy Project (MPP).120 Each website provides legal updates, 
advocates for broadened use, or blogs about experiences with marijuana law.121 
The fact that a government website funnels visitors to marijuana advocacy 
groups may suggest a social acceptance of marijuana not previously present in 
California.122 In 2010, Proposition 19, an effort to decriminalize recreational use 
of marijuana in California, received over forty percent of the votes.123 Although it 
did not pass, it represented a large number of Californians who do not view 
marijuana use as criminal activity. With so many people supporting some degree 
of marijuana use, harsh penalties for lesser offenses will work against law 
enforcement.124 Ultimately, a law inconsistent with social expectations hurts the 
 
sentence. California v. Super. Ct., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 93, 96 (1997). 
116. See infra Part II.D.2 (noting that the California Department of Public Health provides the public 
with contact information to marijuana advocates on the Department’s website). 
117. See Avishalom Tor et al., Fairness and the Willingness to Accept Plea Bargain Offers, 7 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 97, 98 (2010) (stating that a defendant is still likely to reject a good deal if he or she 
thinks it is unfair). 
118. See infra note 125 and accompanying text (stating that the success of the justice system depends on 
the public’s agreement with its implementation). 
119. See Vitiello, supra note 96, at, 63 (describing an argument concerning marijuana legalization heard 
on NPR as uncivil and impassioned but ultimately tired and “unenlightening”). 
120. Medical Marijuana Program, CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, http://www.cdph.ca.gov/ 
PROGRAMS/mmp/Pages/default.aspx (last updated Jan. 8, 2013, 9:42 AM) (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review). 
121. ASA, http://www.safeaccessnow.org/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review); CAL. NORML, http://www.canorml.org/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review); MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT, http://www.mpp.org/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2012) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
122. Medical Marijuana Program, supra note 86. 
123. Charles Cooper, Pot Law Hopes Dashed as California Votes Down Prop. 19, CBS NEWS (Nov. 3, 
2010, 2:10 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20021581-503544.html (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
124. Id.; see also infra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing the practical effects of treating 
defendants inconsistently with social expectations). 
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legal system because, to be effectively employed, society must trust that the 
system is fair.125 
III. THE CARROT: EXPLORING A PARTIAL SOLUTION 
This Part discusses one method of adapting the unlawful cultivation statute to 
become one of California’s “wobblers.”126 It discusses the benefits of such a 
statute in cases of lesser offenders, as well as possible pitfalls such a statute 
would face.127 Ultimately, this Part concludes that a wobbler statute would deal 
with small-scale illegal marijuana cultivators, but would not be a complete 
solution to California’s problems.128 
A. Wobbling Toward a Solution 
In 2011, the California Assembly considered AB 1017, which would have 
amended section 11358 of the Health and Safety Code, turning it into an 
alternative misdemeanor felony statute,129 or “wobbler.”130 Upon introduction of 
the bill, the author commented that the amended law would give prosecutors 
“discretion to charge either a misdemeanor or felony for marijuana cultivation,” 
which would allow the district attorneys to enforce community standards.131 The 
author also cited the resources needed to prosecute felonies rather than 
misdemeanors and the overcrowded condition of prisons in California.132 On the 
other hand, the author stated, the change in law would not offer a “free pass” to 
 
125. See Leif H. Carter & Thomas F. Burke, REASON IN LAW 32 (8th ed. 2010) (stating that social 
values like stability and equality are important to an effective judiciary). 
126. See infra Part III.A (discussing AB 1017). 
127. See infra Part III.B–C (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of wobbler statutes in the context of 
marijuana cultivation). 
128. See infra Part III.D–E (exploring some reasons why simply creating a wobbler statute would not 
constitute a complete solution). 
129. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1017, at 2–3 (Cal. 
May 3, 2011) (summarizing the effect of the proposed law). 
130. See Beckway v. DeShong, 717 F. Supp. 2d 908, 920 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (indicating that in criminal 
law jargon, the offenses that a prosecutor can charge as either felonies or misdemeanors are known as 
“wobblers”). 
131 ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1017, at 2 (Cal. May 3, 
2011). 
132. Id. The author expressed this concern before implementation of Assembly Bill 109 (AB 109). Id. 
The California Legislature passed AB 109  in response to the Supreme Court ruling in Brown v. Plata. See 131 
S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (holding that overcrowding in Californian prisons violated the Eight Amendment). The 
desired effect of this legislation is to reduce the number of non-serious, non-violent, and non-sex offenders in 
state prison, instead sending them to serve felony sentences in county jail. Public Safety Realignment, CAL. 
DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment (last visited Jan. 10, 2013) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). For an exhaustive legislative analysis of AB 109, see Steven Thomas Fazzi, Comment, 
A Primer on the 2011 Corrections Realignment: Why California Placed Felons Under County Control, 44 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 423 (2013). 
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anyone, but merely the possibility of a lesser charge for “backyard grows and 
trimmers.”133 
In support of AB 1017, the California Public Defenders Association argued 
that the change would “untie the hands” of district attorneys, aligning the 
unlawful cultivation statute with “a more consistent and sensible sentencing 
scheme.”134 Citing the discrepancy between Health and Safety Code sections 
11357 (possession) and 11358 (cultivation), the Mendocino County District 
Attorney argued that it makes no sense to prosecute a person differently for the 
same amount of marijuana just because one person possessed marijuana that was 
still on the plant.135 
B. The Benefits of Wobblers 
In California, many crimes may be charged or sentenced as a misdemeanor 
or a felony. This determination is based on the language of the statute, how the 
prosecutor files the complaint, and how the court determines the sentence.136 The 
statutory language that allows a crime to be charged as a wobbler is contained in 
the California Penal Code.137 Only when a statute explicitly allows such a 
sentencing scheme are prosecutors allowed to exercise discretion whether to 
charge a felony or a misdemeanor for violation of that statute.138 
Under a wobbler statute, prosecutors and judges have discretion to reduce the 
possible sentence.139 When a prosecutor charges a wobbler, that prosecutor may 
charge it either as a felony or a misdemeanor.140 If the prosecutor charges the 
wobbler as a misdemeanor, any resulting conviction will be a misdemeanor 
conviction.141 On the other hand, if the prosecutor charges the wobbler as a 
felony, courts still have discretion to reduce the felony sentence to a 
misdemeanor sentence.142 Thus, wobbler statutes allow prosecutors and judges to 
 
133. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1017, at 2–3 (Cal. May 
3, 2011). 
134. Id. at 3. 
135. Letter from C. David Eyster, Mendocino County District Attorney, to Assembly Member Tom 
Ammiano (May 1, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
136. California v. Super. Ct., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 93, 96 (Ct. App. 1997). 
137. PENAL § 17(b). 
138. See California v. Lara, 202 Cal. Rptr. 262 (Ct. App. 1984) (“A sentencing court has no discretion to 
deviate from the punishment prescribed by statute.”); see also Loren L. Barr, Comment, The “Three Strikes 
Dilemma”: Crime Reduction at any Price?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 107, 117–18 (1995) (stating that if a 
prosecutor charges the “wobbler” crime as a felony, the trial court has the discretion to reduce it to a 
misdemeanor). 
139. Barr, supra note 138, at 117–18. 
140. Id. at 118. 
141. Id. 
142. See California v. Hawkins, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 648 (Ct. App. 2002) (stating that courts may 
reduce crimes to a misdemeanor); Barr, supra note 138, at 118 (“If the prosecutor charges the wobbler as a 
felony, the court has a number of methods at its disposal to reduce the crime to a misdemeanor.”). 
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uphold community standards, just as comments on AB 1017 suggested.143 
Furthermore, turning section 11358 into a wobbler may increase the number of 
plea bargains and raise conviction rates.144 
C. The Drawback of Wobblers 
One drawback to the wobbler is that it may lead to uneven application of 
California law.145 Critics of wobbler statutes argue that prosecutors may abuse 
their discretion.146 As one commentator suggests, a prosecutor’s discretion may 
include otherwise impermissible considerations, such as the prosecutor’s own 
ideals, prejudices, or feelings against certain classes of people, or even the 
temptation to lighten their workload.147 In short, the resulting prosecution will 
differ more because of geographical location than anything else.148 
D. To Wobble or Not to Wobble: A Wobbler Statute Would Be Consistent with 
Marijuana Law 
In the context of marijuana cultivation, a wobbler statute would be consistent 
with the overall legal scheme of medical marijuana.149 Section 11362.77(c) of the 
California Health and Safety Code provides that individual counties “may retain 
or enact medical marijuana guidelines allowing qualified patients or primary 
caregivers to exceed the state limits . . . .”150 In fact, California counties differ in 
the amounts of marijuana one may possess under the auspices of the MMP.151 
Some counties adhere to the state-mandated minimum, whereas others greatly 
increase the minimum.152 Thus, different treatment based on geographical 
 
143. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1017, at 2–3 (Cal. May 
3, 2011). 
144. See Loren Gordon, Where to Commit a Crime if You Can Only Spare a Few Days to Serve the 
Time: The Constitutionality of California’s Wobbler Statutes as Applied in the State Today, 33 SW. L. REV. 497, 
506 (2004) (indicating that prosecutors use wobbler statutes to obtain guilty or no contest plea bargains); see 
also supra Part II.D.1 (exploring how mandatory higher sentences can make obtaining convictions more 
difficult).  
145. See generally Gordon, supra note 144, at 503, 505 (stating that prosecutors may inject their own 
personal ideals into their decisions, and policies differ between each prosecutor’s office). 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 503. 
148. See id. (“The ensuing result is that the same crime may be prosecuted and punished differently 
depending on the jurisdictional forum rather than any number of permissible objective factors.”). 
149. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.77(c) (West 2007) (stating that counties may choose to 
allow how much medical marijuana a qualified patient may have in excess of the amount provided by the 
statute). While critics argue for a systemic change reducing prosecutorial discretion, this Comment takes the 
system at face value. 
150. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11362.77(c). 
151. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 31 n.41 (2005). 
152. Id.; see also Caplan, supra note 17, at 132 (“California counties also exhibit great variation as to 
how much marijuana a patient may possess.”). 
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location is implicit in the MMP. Creating a wobbler statute would, consistent 
with section 11362.77 of the California Health and Safety Code, allow counties 
to treat offenders consistent with community standards.153 The California District 
Attorneys Association (CDAA), the California Police Chiefs Association 
(CPCA) and the California Narcotics Officers’ Association (CNOA), however, 
argued against making section 11358 a wobbler.154 
The CNOA argued against AB 1017 on the grounds that decreased penalties 
for marijuana cultivators “amounts to an improvement” in the situations of those 
who have invaded the market with illegal activities.155 Looking at the 
characteristics of wobbler statutes, at least in some cases, the CNOA was 
correct.156 Because there would be no statutory guideline for how to apply the 
new wobbler, it is possible for a district attorney to charge a defendant with only 
a misdemeanor 11358, regardless of the size or location of the cultivation.157 This 
means that it would be possible to charge a person with a misdemeanor who had 
grown multiple thousands of marijuana plants. Thus, turning the unlawful 
cultivation statute into a wobbler would fail to address larger plantations and the 
valid concern that the CNOA expressed in its opposition to AB 1017.158 
E. An Incomplete Solution 
The legislature did not pass AB 1017.159 However, it would have been an 
incomplete solution because it only addressed two of the issues with the current 
cultivation statute: low probability of conviction and inconsistency with social 
norms.160 A better solution to the problem would also address the CNOA’s 
concerns. 
 
153. HEALTH & SAFETY  § 11362.77(c); ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE 
ANALYSIS OF AB 1017, at 2–3 (Cal. May 3, 2011). 
154. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1017, at 3 (Cal. 
May 3, 2011) (setting out the CNOA’s objections to AB 1017 and listing the CDAA, the CPCA, and the CNOA 
as opponents to AB 1017). 
155. Id. 
156. See generally id. (failing to set any statutory guidelines for application of a misdemeanor charge); 
California v. Hawkins, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 648 (Ct. App. 2002) (stating that courts may use their discretion 
to reduce felony crimes to misdemeanors). 
157. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1017, at 2–3 (Cal. 
May 3, 2011) (explaining that the misdemeanor charge could be used for lesser offenders); see also AB 1017, 
2011 Leg., 2011–20012 Sess. (Cal. 2011) (as introduced on February 18, 2011, but not enacted) (providing no 
restriction for offering a misdemeanor charge to large-scale cultivators or those who cultivate in specific areas 
of the state). 
158. Id. 
159. BILL HISTORY OF AB 1017, (Feb. 1, 2012), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-
12/bill/asm/ab_1001-1050/ab_1017_bill_20120201_history.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
160. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1017, at 2–3 (Cal. May 
3, 2011); see also Gordon, supra note 144, at 506 (alluding to the fact that prosecutors use wobbler statutes to 
increase the chances of conviction by offering plea bargains). 
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IV. FINDING A MORE COMPLETE SOLUTION 
This Part explores in greater detail the problems that result from large-scale 
illegal marijuana cultivation and use of public lands for such cultivation.161 
Specifically, this Part illustrates how violence and marijuana cultivation are often 
linked, and examines the various ways illegal marijuana cultivation contributes to 
destruction of the environment.162 Finally, this Part explores some economic 
implications of regulating marijuana cultivation and concludes that such 
regulation could help deter larger, more environmentally harmful cultivation.163 
A. Unlawful Cultivation as a Social Harm 
Marijuana cultivation may be legal under certain circumstances, but unlawful 
cultivation is still linked with various social harms, particularly violence and 
environmental degradation.164 This section explores these social harms to better 
define policy goals and formulate a new cultivation statute. 
1. Unlawful Cultivation and Violence 
In September 2010, the Fresno County Board of Supervisors, citing recent 
violence, passed an emergency initiative to ban the outdoor cultivation of 
medical marijuana.165 In December 2011, the City of Fresno passed a similar ban 
after a man was killed trying to steal marijuana from an outdoor cultivation 
site.166 In January 2012, the city extended the ban, asserting that outdoor 
marijuana cultivation led to violent crime.167 
Fresno is not the only California city that has seen violence linked to 
marijuana cultivation.168 Evidence from multiple counties suggests that violence 
 
161. See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing violence and environmental degradation). 
162. See infra Part IV.A. (summarizing some of the problems with unlawful marijuana cultivation on 
public land). 
163. See infra Part IV.B (noting that the CAMP program might have created more demand for marijuana 
and that the legislature could take a different approach to reduce demand). 
164. See infra Part IV.A.1–2 (discussing the problems that are linked to marijuana cultivation). 
165. Gene Haagenson & Tommy Tran, Fresno County Passes Temporary Ban on Outdoor Marijuana 
Gardens, ABC LOCAL (Sept. 4, 2010), http://abclocal.go.com/kfsn/story?section=news/local&id=7668091 (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
166. Gene Haagenson, Fresno City Council Bans Outdoor Marijuana Cultivation, ABC LOCAL (Dec. 
15, 2011), http://abclocal.go.com/kfsn/story?section=news/local&id=8468085 (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review). 
167. Gene Haagenson, Fresno Extends Ban on Outdoor Marijuana Growing, ABC LOCAL (Jan. 26, 
2012), http://abclocal.go.com/kfsn/story?section=news/local&id=8520661 (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review). 
168. E.g., Diana Marcum, Central Valley’s Booming Medical Marijuana Crop Draws Violence, L.A. 
TIMES (Oct. 2, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/02/local/la-me-pot-crop-20101003 (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (detailing the heightened level of violence associated with marijuana cultivation); Sean 
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associated with marijuana cultivation is a serious problem California.169 In April 
2009, law enforcement officials in Humboldt County responded to a home 
invasion.170 The target was a marijuana “grow house.”171 While officials suggested 
that violence of this kind goes unreported due to the uncertain legality of growing 
marijuana, they cited eight occasions between April 2008 and April 2009 in 
which violence was used against marijuana cultivators.172 Elsewhere, similar 
episodes have occurred; for example, a gang-related home-invasion in Lindsay, 
California resulted in death.173 Local marijuana vendors have also recognized the 
violence surrounding marijuana cultivation.174  
One of the salient features of large-scale marijuana grow operations is the 
presence of firearms.175 In September 2011, law enforcement officials raided 
multiple large-scale grow operations throughout California, many of which also 
yielded firearms.176 In a raid in San Mateo County that yielded over 5,000 
marijuana plants, law enforcement officers found a loaded .22 caliber rifle.177 In 
the same month, a raid in Humboldt County that yielded over one-million 
dollars’ worth of marijuana also yielded three firearms.178 An investigation in 
Napa County that began in September 2011 and concluded in October of the 
same year yielded a .22 caliber sawed-off rifle, a .22 caliber handgun, five 
shotguns, and four other rifles.179 As Fresno’s police chief told the Fresno City 
Council in January 2012: “The people that are protecting those groves have 
armed themselves with firearms.”180 To make matters worse, law enforcement 
 
Garmire, Growing Violence: Marijuana Gardens Are Robbery Targets Throughout Humboldt County, TIMES-
STANDARD (Apr. 19, 2009, 1:29 AM), http://www.times-standard.com/localnews/ci_12177281 (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
169. E.g., supra notes 167–168 (exploring violence linked with cultivation); infra notes 170–171, 174–
177 and accompanying text (detailing more violence associated with cultivation). 
170. Garmire, supra note 168.  
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Marcum, supra note 168. 
174. See California v. Colvin, 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 859 (Ct. App. 2012) (“Patients are allowed no 
more than one ounce of marijuana in one day, and, to minimize the chance of crime, each Holistic establishment 
has no more than two to three pounds of marijuana at any time.”). 
175. E.g., infra notes 177–180 (discussing the firearms that police found during various raids). 
176. See generally id. (demonstrating a link between firearms and cultivation). 
177. More Than 5,000 Pot Plants Seized in San Mateo Co., ABC NEWS (Oct. 4, 2011), http://abclocal. 
go.com/kgo/ story?section=news/local/peninsula&id=8378328 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
178. Press Release, Humboldt Cnty. Dist. Att’y, Large Scale Marijuana Cultivation Operation 
Discovered Near Dinsmore (Oct. 28, 2011), available at https://co.humboldt.ca.us/distatty/pdf/PR.Criminal. 
Dinsmore.MJRaid.Subm.2011.1028.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
179. Napa Special Investigations Bureau, Marijuana Busts Yield Towering Plants, 19 Arrests, NAPA 
VALLEY PATCH (Oct. 14, 2011), http://napa.patch.com/articles/photos-show-towering-super-pot-plants (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). 
180. Haagenson, Fresno Extends Ban on Outdoor Marijuana Growing, supra note 167. 
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officials have cited violent Mexican drug cartels as the culprits behind large-scale 
marijuana grow operations.181 
2. Unlawful Cultivation and Environmental Degradation 
Large-scale marijuana cultivation damages California’s environment and 
natural resources.182 In Yosemite National Park, for instance, where sixty rangers 
patrolled over one-thousand square miles as of 2009, “[c]ultivating marijuana . . . 
has noticeably affected the water quality, animal life, and health and safety of the 
public.”183 In addition to the danger to wildlife and hikers, large-scale marijuana 
cultivation negatively affects California during drought years by diverting 
precious water resources.184 
In 2007, rangers in Yosemite National Park located a marijuana grow 
operation that included over seven-thousand plants, herbicides, pesticides, and a 
complex irrigation system.185 The National Park Service reported that substantial 
“natural resource destruction” resulted from the operation.186 Cultivators divert 
natural water sources, even damming streams, to achieve effective irrigation 
systems.187 Artificial irrigation systems lead to erosion of natural habitat, which 
affects wildlife.188 
Large-scale marijuana cultivators harm wildlife indirectly through detriment 
to their habitat, and directly by killing animals, including endangered species, 
through the use of chemicals or by poaching.189 Marijuana cultivators use 
pesticides and herbicides to keep their marijuana plants healthy.190 Illegal 
marijuana cultivators will often use herbicides and pesticides that have been 
banned in California.191 Further, cultivators may use generators, which can leak 
 
181. Tim McGirk, Mexican Drug Cartels Set Up Shop in California Parks, TIME (Aug. 22, 2009), 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1917547,00.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
182. Jessica Intrator et al., Note, Student Review of Selected Panels at the California State Bar’s 2009 
Environmental Law Conference at Yosemite, 36 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 227, 228 (2009). 
183. Id. at 227–28.  
184. Jennifer Lance, Marijuana Plantations Compound California Drought, BLUE LIVING IDEAS (Oct. 
7, 2009), http://bluelivingideas.com/2009/10/07/marijuana-plantations-compound-california-drought/ (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). 
185. Marijuana Gardens Raided in Yosemite National Park, NAT’L PARK SERV. (Aug. 14, 2007), 
http://www.nps.gov/yose/parknews/marijuana2007.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
186. Id. 
187. Intrator et al., supra note 182, at 228. 
188. See id. (stating that the grower’s measures to divert water lead to negative consequences for fish 
and any habitat that the fish use to spawn). 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. Nancy Upham, Be Safe on Our Public Lands: What to Do if You Encounter a Marijuana 
Cultivation Site, U.S. FOREST SERVICE (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/inyo/alerts-notices/ 
?cid=stelprdb5324909 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
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fuel into the soil and water supply.192 Some cultivators leave hazardous materials, 
such as sewage and trash.193 They create a danger of wildfire through the use of 
chemicals, generators, and cooking fires.194 Aside from the indirect effect on 
wildlife, cultivators may poach wildlife.195 In Yosemite, cultivators kill animals 
for a variety of purposes. They “hunt[] deer for meat, they kill[] bear to hang as a 
deterrent to other wildlife, and even poach[]” endangered species, such as the 
ring-tail cat, to keep “for a souvenir.”196  
Even on the federal level, agencies recognize the deleterious environmental 
effects of marijuana cultivation.197 The Office of National Drug Control Policy 
stated that “[o]utdoor marijuana cultivation . . . has negative environmental 
effects.”198 The paper cited the same kinds of problems that have plagued 
Yosemite National Park: “chemical contamination and alteration of watersheds; 
diversion of natural water courses; elimination of native vegetation; wildfire 
hazards; poaching of wildlife; and disposal of garbage, non-biodegradable 
materials, and human waste.”199 In California, the problem is so prevalent that the 
United States Forest Service has printed warnings in the Mendocino National 
Forest that instruct hikers and visitors on what to do if they stumble upon a 
marijuana grow operation.200  
B. Trends in Unlawful Cultivation 
Legislative action can affect the market for marijuana just as it affects  any 
other market.201 Because the market for marijuana encompasses not just the sale 
and use, but the production of marijuana, the legislature should consider the 
economic implications of its choice to amend the cultivation statute.202 
 
192. Intrator et al., supra note 182, at 228. 
193. Upham, supra note 191. 
194. Intrator et al., supra note 182, at 228. 
195. Marijuana Gardens Raided, supra note 185. 
196. Intrator et al., supra note 182, at 228. 
197. Marijuana Cultivation on U.S. Public Lands: Hearing Before the Senate Caucus on Int’l Narcotics 
Control, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Gil Kerlikowske, Dir., Off. of Nat’l Drug Control). 
198. Id. 
199. Id. 
200. Marijuana Cultivation on U.S. Public Lands: Hearing Before the Senate Caucus on Int’l Narcotics 
Control, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Congressman Mike Thompson, Representative, Cal. 1st Cong. Dist.). 
201. See infra Part IV.B.1–2 (noting that the CAMP program might have created more demand for 
marijuana, and that the legislature could take a different approach to reduce demand). 
202. Id. 
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1. Some Basic Economic Observations: Eradication Efforts and the Price 
of Marijuana 
In order to define policy goals for controlling illegal marijuana cultivation, it 
is useful to examine the economic history of marijuana cultivation. Factors to 
consider include the number of plants grown and their location in relation to the 
cost of marijuana and California’s legal stance regarding marijuana cultivation.203 
At first glance, it is clear that illegal marijuana cultivation has risen significantly 
since the advent of the CUA and MMP.204 
In 1983, amid the war on drugs205 and during a time that NORML calls its 
darkest days,206 California saw the creation of the Campaign Against Marijuana 
Planting (CAMP).207 CAMP, which ceased operations when the legislature cut its 
funding in 2012,208 was a “unique multi-agency law enforcement task force 
managed by the Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement.”209 It consisted of federal, state, 
 
203. Basic economic principals tell us that the number or amount of a particular product produced, in 
this case marijuana, affects the market for that product. See Matt Johnson, Economic Basics: Supply and 
Demand, SOPHIA (last visited Jun. 25, 2013), http://www.sophia.org/economic-basics-supply-and-demand-
tutorial (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (demonstrating how higher supply correlates to lower 
demand). California’s interest in public safety requires it to concern itself with the location of marijuana 
cultivation cites, and Section 11358 of the Health and Safety Code makes it clear that cultivation should be 
considered within the broader scheme of marijuana statutes. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11358 (West 
2007) (alluding to legal marijuana cultivation by including the language “except as otherwise provided by 
law.”); see also Part IV.A (exploring the public safety hazards associated with mariuana cultivation). 
204. See CAMPAIGN AGAINST MARIJUANA PLANTING, CAMP FINAL REPORT 1 (1983), available at 
http://library.humboldt.edu/humco/holdings/CAMP.htm [hereinafter CAMP FINAL REPORT] (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (discussing the history of the Campaign Against Marijuana Planting (CAMP)). 
205. Richard Nixon declared the “War on Drugs” in 1971. See Frontline, Thirty Years of America’s 
Drug War, PBS (last visited June 25, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline /shows/drugs/cron/ (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (providing a timeline outlining many of the more significant events in the 
“War on Drugs”). 
206. See Marijuana Law Reform Timeline: NORML’s and Marijuana’s Law Reform Timeline in 
America, NORML (last visited June 25, 2013),  http://norml.org/about/item/marijuana-law-reform-timeline (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the time period from 1980 to 1988 as “NORML’s darkest days 
politically and financially with most of the political efforts directed to” lobbying and organizing).  
207. See CAMP FINAL REPORT 1, supra note 204 and accompanying text.  
208. Julie Johnson, Annual Pot Eradication Program Scaled Back, THE PRESS DEMOCRAT (Jul. 24, 
2012), http://www.pressdemocrat.com/article/20120724/ARTICLES/120729742 (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review). 
209. Campaign Against Marijuana Planting, OFF. ATTY. GENERAL, http://ag.ca.gov/bne/camp.php (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also CAMP FINAL REPORT, supra note 204 
(listing all the agencies involved under federal and state categories). In CAMP’s inception year, it included the 
following federal agencies: Drug Enforcement Administration; Bureau of Land Management; U.S. Forest 
Service; U.S. Marshal’s Service; Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; U.S. Customs; Federal Bureau of 
Investigation; Bureau of Indian Affairs; and the following state agencies: Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement; 
Western States Information Network; Office of Emergency Services; California Department of Forestry; 
California Highway Patrol; and California Army National Guard. Id.  
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and local agencies210 with the overarching objective of significantly diminishing 
unlawful cultivation of marijuana in California.211 The main focus of CAMP’s 
work was decreasing cultivation and trafficking, with the goal of “increasing 
public and environmental safety by removing marijuana growers from public and 
private lands.”212 
By the late 1980s, critics claimed that organizations such as CAMP had only 
spurred the evolution of the marijuana market.213 Critics of CAMP in particular 
claimed that efforts to eradicate the market by targeting large grows have merely 
caused marijuana farmers to establish “guerilla patches,” which are harder to see 
using aerial surveillance techniques, and have also caused them to move their 
operations to public lands.214 Critics also point to the increase in indoor grow 
operations.215  
CAMP’s data does show a lower number of eradicated plants after 1989, but 
only up to the mid-nineties.216 According to CAMP, the raids between 1993 and 
1996 yielded approximately the same number of plants as the few that had been 
seized in 1983, the year CAMP was organized.217 Starting in 1997, however, the 
data shows a consistent increase in the number of plants seized per year, from 
over 100,000 in 1997 to over 1.6 million in 2006.218 In 2009, “California 
produced more outdoor-grown marijuana . . . than Mexico,”219 most of it grown 
on public land.220 One report indicates that the potential amount of marijuana 
produced in California totals as much as 155,042 metric tons per year.221 The data 
 
210. See CAMP FINAL REPORT, supra note 204, at 1 (including the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration; U.S. Bureau of Land Management; U.S. Forest Service; Office of National Drug Control 
Policy; U.S. National Park Service; Governor’s Office of Emergency Services; California National Guard; 
California Department of Fish and Game and California State Parks, as well as police departments and sheriff’s 
offices). 
211. Id. 
212. Campaign Against Marijuana Planting, supra note 209. 
213. James B. Slaughter, Marijuana Prohibition in the United States: History and Analysis of a Failed 
Policy, 21 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 417, 459 (1988). 
214. Id. at 459–60. 
215. Id. at 460. CAMP came under fire for other reasons as well. See Gayle J. Mayfield, Comment, 
Florida v. Riley: The Beginning or the End of “Big Brother”?, 12 CRIM. JUST. J. 53, 59–60 (1990) (describing 
the use of injunctions against CAMP in the context of search and seizure law). 
216. See 2009 CAMPAIGN AGAINST MARIJUANA PLANTING STATISTICS, HUMBOLDT ST. UNIV. (2006), 
available at http://library.humboldt.edu/humco/holdings/CAMP/CAMP2009.pdf (illustrating a decrease of over 
60,000 plants from 1989 to 1990, but then a steep increase in eradicated plants after 1996) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
217. Id. 
218. Id. 
219. MARIJUANA PRODUCTION IN CALIFORNIA, CENTRAL VALLEY CAL. HIDTA, 3 (2010). 
220. See 2009 CAMPAIGN AGAINST MARIJUANA PLANTING STATISTICS, HUMBOLDT ST. UNIV. (2009), 
available at http://library.humboldt.edu/humco/holdings/CAMP.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(revealing that of 4,463,917 plants seized in 2009, 3,397,016 (76%) of them were seized on public land). 
221. MARIJUANA PRODUCTION IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 219, at 4. 
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appears to correlate with developments of recent marijuana laws.222 The 
correlation suggests that California’s legal stance on marijuana has an effect on 
illegal production, but a brief look at the economy of marijuana also helps 
explain these numbers. 
One outdoor marijuana plant yields two-hundred grams, or seven ounces, of 
marijuana.223 An indoor plant yields one-half that.224 Between 2001 and 2005, the 
cost of one gram of marijuana averaged approximately six dollars.225 Thus, where 
an indoor home cultivation of twenty plants would yield approximately twelve-
thousand dollars’ worth of marijuana, a larger cultivation of one-thousand plants, 
outdoors on public land, would yield over one-million dollars’ worth of 
marijuana.226 The cost, however—a possible felony conviction—would be the 
same.227 Furthermore, CAMP is no longer functioning and eradication efforts on 
public land will be scaled back.228 Thus, with a single, inflexible penalty for the 
cultivation for any amount of marijuana, the system has incentivized large-scale 
cultivation by keeping the penalties the same for higher amounts of marijuana.229  
2.  Using the Law to Influence the Cultivation Economy 
Whether shifting large cultivation operations to farmland, or reducing the 
size of individual cultivation sites, California’s marijuana statutes have affected 
cultivation economy, which inevitably affects the cultivators’ behavior. For 
instance, there has been a recent increase in farmland utilization.230 While 
 
222. Compare 2009 STATISTICS, supra note 216, to the timing of the CUA, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 
11362.5 (West 2007) (enacted in 1996) and MMPA, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11362.71 (West 2007) (enacted 
in 2003) (showing a steady increase in marijuana eradication after 1997 and a sharp increase after 2003). 
223. Jon Gettman, Marijuana Production in the United States, BULLETIN OF CANNABIS REFORM 7 (Dec. 
2006), available at http://www.drugscience.org/Archive/bcr2/MJCropReport_2006.pdf (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
224. Id. 
225. See id. at 9 (listing prices ranging from $5.91 to $6.14). These numbers only approximate the value 
of marijuana, and like any other products, can fluctuate with time and market forces. See Lindy Stevens, How Is 
the Street Value of Marijuana Determined, MICHIGAN DAILY (Mar. 6, 2008), http://www.michigandaily.com/ 
content/how-street-value-marijuana-determined (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing a rough 
calculus performed by the Drug Enforcement Agency to determine drugs’ street value). Based on DEA 
calculations, the price of marijuana can fluctuate significantly. Id. 
226. See id. (showing prices for one gram of marijuana for the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005 
as $6.14, $6.79, $5.83, $5.47, and $5.91 respectively). 
227. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11358 (West 2007) (criminalizing cultivation of marijuana 
irrespective of the number of plants). 
228. Johnson, supra note 208. 
229. See Landsburg, supra note 102 and accompanying text (stating that criminals weigh the potential 
cost of crime with the potential benefits that they may reap from the crime). 
230. See Marijuana Cultivation on U.S. Public Lands: Hearing Before the Senate Caucus on Int’l 
Narcotics Control, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Sen. Diane Feinstein, Chairman, U.S. Sen. Caucus on Int’l 
Narcotics Control) (citing an increase in farmland utilization and a decrease from seventy grows discovered on 
public land to thirty between 2009 and 2011). 
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federally-led efforts to eradicate marijuana plantations continue, laws like the 
CUA and MMPA have contributed to the shift to farmland use in California.231 
The proposed statute would support small-scale cultivation and discourage large-
scale cultivation on public lands, further expediting the shift.232 
Another example of a legal change that has caused an economic shift is the 
recent downturn in marijuana prices. The recent legal shift to regulated marijuana 
appears to have dealt a blow to illegal marijuana growers all over the state by 
lowering the cost of marijuana.233 Because Californians are now able to grow 
their own marijuana legally, demand is lower than in previous years.234 Because 
the demand for marijuana is lower, the cost of marijuana has dropped.235 In some 
areas of California that rely heavily on marijuana cultivation, the drop in prices 
has been catastrophic for the local economy.236 Since supply is higher than 
demand, growers are forced to expand production to realize the same profits.237 In 
the short term, large increases in production may have caused the rise in the 
number of marijuana plants that authorities eradicated on public land.238  The 
proposed statute should address this escalation, something AB 1017 failed to do. 
The breadth of possible economic responses to making section 11358 a 
wobbler underlines the incompleteness of AB 1017. In this economic 
environment, amending the cultivation statute to become a wobbler may have 
any of the following consequences: the price of marijuana would decrease more, 
leading to even larger plantations; a larger number of plantations throughout the 
state in light of the possibility of lower penalties; or there could be no noticeable 
effect.239 Ideally, a wobbler would lower the price of marijuana further, making 
large-scale operations too costly in light of the chance of losing the entire crop to 
 
231. Sasha Khokha, Where the Marijuana Grows: Feds Target Landowners, NPR (Oct. 25, 2011), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/10/25/141690170/where-the-marijuana-grows-feds-target-landowners (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (explaining that marijuana growers in California largely ignore federal authorities 
because of California marijuana law). 
232. E.g., id. (arguing that eradication programs like that presented by CAMP are ineffective). 
233. Michael Montgomery, Plummeting Marijuana Prices Create a Panic in Calif., NPR (May 15, 
2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126806429 (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
234. See id. (discussing the increase in supply in the California marijuana market, which also tends to 
suggest a decreased demand). 
235. See Id. (exploring the effects of increased production of marijuana in California, including a decline 
in marijuana prices and consequently lower profits for suppliers). 
236. Id. (“California’s pot economy is transforming, and it’s starting to resemble a real commodities 
market where only big players can compete.”). 
237. Id. 
238. See 2009 CAMPAIGN AGAINST MARIJUANA PLANTING STATISTICS, supra note 220 (showing an 
upward trend in spite of the felony charge under Section 11358). 
239. As Professor Caplan has demonstrated, shifts in marijuana law have produced unintended results; 
these are merely some of the more likely results and do not represent an exhaustive list of the possibilities. See 
Caplan, supra note 17 (discussing consequences of recent marijuana legislation such as increased use of 
marijuana by younger people, massive increases in the number of qualified patients, and explosive 
commercialization of the marijuana market). 
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eradication.240 On the other end of the spectrum, there is the possibility that lower 
penalties might encourage would-be cultivators to go into business, even 
providing a friendly market for outside organizations such as drug cartels to 
exploit.241 Based on the deleterious consequences of large-scale operations, 
particularly on public land, the latter possibility should be avoided at all costs, 
hence the CNOA’s opposition to AB 1017.242 In order to prevent the possible 
negative consequences, the proposed statute should increase penalties for large-
scale cultivation. 
The proposed statute should therefore be twofold, increasing penalties for 
major offenders while decreasing penalties for lesser offenders. Providing lower 
sentences for lesser offenders should not take pressure off people who grow 
thousands of plants for commercial gain while creating a public safety hazard and 
wreaking havoc on California’s natural habitat.243 The trend toward numerous 
large-scale operations demonstrates that the charges currently associated with 
section 11358 are not enough to deter major offenders.244 The proposed statute 
should therefore function to encourage smaller grows by individuals, leading to 
decreased demand and lower marijuana prices.245 At the same time, the proposed 
statute should block any attempt to create a safe haven for major offenders and 
drug cartels by mandating higher sentences for large-scale cultivation on public 
land.246 Even if the statute does not end large-scale cultivation, it should 
encourage a shift to private lands, such as farmland, where environmental 
degradation will play a much smaller role. The proposed statute could encourage 
smaller marijuana gardens by providing a carrot—lower sentences—to lesser 
offenders, while simultaneously using the stick—increasing penalties for those 
who threaten California’s public safety and environmental welfare—to achieve 
its public policy goals.247 
V. CULTIVATING A PROPOSED STATUTE 
This Part focuses on the terms of the proposed statute. First, this Part 
examines the form and function of an unrelated criminal statute: California’s 
 
240. See Montgomery, supra note 233 (observing that California’s relaxed legal restrictions on 
marijuana have contributed to a drop in the drug’s costs). 
241. See McGirk, supra note 181 (discussing how Mexican drug cartels use the land in California State 
Parks for covert marijuana grow sites). 
242. Marijuana Cultivation on U.S. Public Lands, supra note 230; id. (opening Statement of Sen. 
Charles E. Grassley, Co-Chairman, U.S. Sen. Caucus on Int’l Narcotics Control). 
243. See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing some of the ways that unlawful marijuana cultivation contributes 
to environmental degradation). 
244. 2009 CAMPAIGN AGAINST MARIJUANA PLANTING STATISTICS, supra note 220. 
245. See Montgomery, supra note 233 (observing that California’s relaxed legal restrictions on marijuana 
have contributed to a drop in the drug’s costs). 
246. Id. 
247. See supra Part IV (setting forth California’s policy goals regarding marijuana cultivation). 
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assault with a deadly weapon statute.248 The assault with a deadly weapon statute 
is a wobbler, and mandates higher, felony sentences for more egregious behavior, 
providing a useful template for the proposed statute.249 Then, it formulates 
statutory terms to address the policy goals discussed in previous sections, as well 
as statutory provisions that could be altered while still meeting certain policy 
goals.250 This Part suggests that this statutory format is better-suited for dealing 
with California’s unique marijuana statutory scheme and the dangers of large-
scale illegal marijuana cultivation.251 
A. Selecting an Appropriate Sentencing Guideline: Using Section 245 of the 
Penal Code as a Model 
Recent changes in marijuana law have led to a deluge of unintended 
consequences.252 In amending a statute that has remained unchanged for thirty 
years, it is imperative that the statute is clear in its goals, consistent with the 
overall scheme of California marijuana law, is easy for police officers to 
effectively apply in the field, and causes minimal confusion in the courts. This 
section explores how the amended cultivation statute should be structured to 
maximize its effectiveness and minimize its confusion. The form of the proposed 
statute should resemble California’s assault with a deadly weapon statute because 
such a structure allows the legislature to decrease penalties for lesser offenders 
while requiring stricter sentences for major offenders. 
California’s assault with a deadly weapon statute, section 245 of the Penal 
Code, provides a useful model.253 Aggravating factors aside, section 245 deals 
with assault with deadly weapons, and provides that a “person who commits an 
assault . . . by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury” may 
receive a misdemeanor sentence or a felony sentence of up to four years in 
prison.254 A wobbler charge is available for both an assault with a firearm and an 
assault with any other deadly instrument.255 From there, the number of years in 
prison increases depending on whether certain aggravating factors are present.256 
 
248. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245 (West 2007). 
249. See infra Part V.A (discussing the assault with a deadly weapons statute, Section 245 of the 
California Penal Code, as a model for an effective marijuana cultivation statute); see also, e.g., PENAL CODE 
§ 245 (providing that the number of years that a person spends in prison for assault with a deadly weapon 
increase as the egregiousness of the offense increases). 
250. See infra Part V.B–C (outlining and creating the proposed statute and discussing which portions of 
the proposed statute could be modified to meet specific legislative goals, such as exact quantity of marijuana). 
251. See infra Part V.C (suggesting that elements such as the exact quantity and precise sentences could 
be changed without seriously diminishing the usefulness of the statute). 
252. Caplan, supra note 17.  
253. PENAL § 245. 
254. Id. § 245(a)(1). 
255. Id. § 245(a)(1)–(2). 
256. See generally id. § 245 (aggravating factors are based on the type of weapon used and the nature of 
_09_STARR_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2014 9:44 AM 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 44 
1097 
Depending on a defendant’s choice of weapon or target, section 245 offers 
anything from a misdemeanor sentence to twelve years in prison.257 For instance, 
if the perpetrator carries out the assault with a single action revolver—as opposed 
to a semiautomatic pistol—it is possible that the defendant could receive a 
misdemeanor sentence.258 On the other hand, if the weapon is a semiautomatic, 
the possibility for a misdemeanor evaporates, and the law requires a heftier 
felony sentence of three, six, or nine years in prison.259 If the weapon is a machine 
gun, the felony sentence jumps to four, eight, or twelve years in prison.260 These 
graduated steps are consistent with a legislative scheme of controlling the use of 
semiautomatic weapons and machine guns.261 
Other than supporting California’s gun control policy, section 245 also 
supports a public policy of protecting emergency workers in the line of duty.262 
According to section 245, if defendants assault a person whom they know or 
should know is a peace officer or firefighter, the sentence is three, four, or five 
years in prison.263 In a combination of policy considerations, section 245 merges 
the prohibited conduct to include punishments for assaulting emergency 
personnel with semiautomatic weapons and machine guns, with punishments 
reaching as far as six, nine, or twelve years.264 The unlawful cultivation statute 
should resemble the assault with a deadly weapon statute, because this model 
allows increased penalties for specific types of conduct associated with marijuana 
cultivation with minimal confusion. 
Rather than covering all marijuana cultivation with a blanket of higher 
penalties, which would contravene the clear steps toward leniency and legality, 
the legislature should amend the cultivation statute to punish major offenders 
more severely and lesser offenders less severely.265 It is clear from the support for 
proposed changes in AB 1017 that legislators, defense attorneys, and at least one 
district attorney see the value in making the cultivation statute a wobbler.266 On 
 
the victim. Higher penalties are imposed if the victim is a police officer or firefighter.). 
257. Compare id. § 245(a)(1) (providing for a sentence in county jail), with id. § 245(d)(3) (setting forth 
a sentencing scheme of six, nine, or twelve years). 
258. Id. Although Section 245(a)(2) covers assault with a firearm, Section 245(b) covers assault with 
semiautomatic weapons, which would not include a single-action revolver. Id. § 245(a)(2), (b). 
259. Id. § 245(b). 
260. Id. § 245(a)(3). 
261. See id. § 30505(a) (West 2011) (“The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the proliferation 
and use of assault weapons poses a threat to the health, safety, and security of all citizens of this state.”); see 
also Hunter Starr, Pandora’s Lockbox: Is the Legislature Locking Guns in a Box, or Unleashing Concealed 
Weapons?, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 779 (2012) (exploring California’s public policy of gun control). 
262. See id. § 245(c) (discussing punishment for defendants who assault police officers or firefighters). 
263. Id. 
264. Id. § 245(d)(3). 
265. See supra Part III.D (discussing the suitability of wobbler statutes when it comes to marijuana 
cultivators). 
266. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1017, at 2–3 (Cal. 
May 3, 2011); see also Letter from C. David Eyster, supra note 136 (asserting the Mendocino County District 
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the other hand, it is clear from CAMP, the California District Attorneys 
Association, and from an environmental standpoint, that there are specific kinds 
of criminal behaviors associated with marijuana cultivation that should not be 
eligible for lowered sentences.267 
B. The Proposed Statute 
This Comment proposes a model marijuana cultivation statute that would 
increase penalties for specific types of conduct associated with marijuana 
cultivation while minimizing the resulting confusion. The first section of the 
unlawful marijuana cultivation statute should remain the same as the current 
statute.268 Using the historical statutory language, with the addition of wobbler 
language, would minimize confusion.269 Thus, a multipart cultivation statute 
would begin as section 11358(a) of the California Health and Safety Code: 
“Every person who plants, cultivates, harvests, dries, or processes any marijuana 
or any part thereof, except as otherwise provided by law, shall be punished by 
imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or in the state prison or 
pursuant to subdivision (h) of section 1170 of the Penal Code.”270 
The second section of the amended cultivation statute should concentrate on 
these public policy concerns: deterring large illegal operations, deterring the use 
of public land, deterring damage to public land, and deterring danger to the 
public.271 Considering that large-scale grow operations present a more lucrative 
opportunity to anyone who would use violence to obtain or protect the plants and 
that large-scale operations often take place on public lands, cultivation of a large 
number of plants increases the probability and extent of violent crime and 
environmental degradation.272 Thus, the second section of the new statute should 
increase penalties for cultivation of a larger number of plants.273 
 
Attorney C. David Eyster’s support for AB 1017). 
267. Id.; see also supra Part IV.A–B (discussing the environmental implications of marijuana cultivation 
on public land and CAMP’s efforts to reduce that activity). 
268. “Every person who plants, cultivates, harvests, dries, or processes any marijuana or any part 
thereof, except as otherwise provided by law, shall be punished by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of 
Section 1170 of the Penal Code.” CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11358 (West 2007 & Supp. 2013). 
269. See supra Part II.C (noting that more recent cases interpreting the statute focus on the statute’s 
construction with the CUA, rather than the meaning of the statute itself). 
270. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11358. 
271. See supra Part IV.A (discussing all of these social issues). 
272. Id. 
273. The problem with a statutory attack on large cultivation sites is that the California Supreme Court 
has already held that a legal limit on the number of plants one may possess is an unconstitutional check on the 
will of the voters as it is applied to the CUA. California v. Kelly, 222 P.3d 186, 188 (Cal. 2010). On the other 
hand, because the CUA is an affirmative defense that can still be employed, and the amendment would not seek 
to limit the number of plants that could be claimed under the CUA, a higher sentence for a larger number of 
plants should be relatively safe from a constitutional challenge. See id. (holding that the provision of the 
Medical Marijuana Program limiting quantities of marijuana were only unconstitutional as applied to the CUA). 
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In numerous grow operations shut down by CAMP, there have been 
thousands of marijuana plants at each major site, whether on public or private 
land.274 Because large grows on public and private land can lead to violence and 
environmental degradation, the initial penalty increase should apply to both 
public and private land. The statutory number of plants should appeal to the 
common sense of voters and stay out of the reach of the CUA defense as 
applied275: for instance, five-hundred plants, mature or otherwise.276 Due to the 
recent confusion regarding dispensaries,277 the proposed statute should not raise 
the sentence too high for even this large number of plants. Section 11358(b) 
should read: “every person who cultivates five-hundred or more marijuana 
plants, regardless of the maturity of the plants, shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the state prison or pursuant to section 1170(h) of the Penal 
Code.” As such, organizations like the California District Attorneys Association 
can rest easy knowing that large-scale operations will still be punishable as a 
felony, while still preserving felony time in a county jail as a sentencing option. 
The third section of the statute should address the public hazard of 
cultivation on public lands.278 As discussed above, growth on public lands raises 
concerns simply not associated with growth on private lands, such as destruction 
of wildlife, increases chances of wildfires, and contamination of natural water 
sources.279 As was the case in section 245 of the Penal Code, and because large 
plantations are particularly detrimental to public lands, the punishment for the 
number of plants should be joined with the public hazards of violence and 
environmental degradation.280 Thus, section 11358(c) would read: “every person 
 
274. See 2009 CAMPAIGN AGAINST MARIJUANA PLANTING STATISTICS, available at http://w3.calema. 
ca.gov/WebPage/oeswebsite.nsf/PDF/Campaign%20Against%20Marijuana%20Planting%20Program%20(CA
MP)/$file/CAMP%20%20OK%20JO%20AM.pdf (last visited May 6, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (stating that in 2009, CAMP conducted 665 raids and seized over four-million plants).  
275. See California v. Kelly, 222 P.3d 186, 188 (Cal. 2010) (holding that to the extent that the MMPA 
put a limit on the number of plants that could be grown under the protection of the CUA, it was 
unconstitutional). While the CUA does not place a limit on the number of plants that may be grown by a person, 
the MMP provides useful insight as to the number of plants that would be required by a seriously ill person. 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.77 (West 2007). The proposed should avoid the appearance of 
unconstitutionally amending the CUA. 
276. According to Section 841 of title 21 of the United States Code, possession of one-thousand plants 
with the intent to distribute them can result in a sentence of “imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years 
or more than life.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006). If the number of plants reaches one-thousand, then federal 
prosecutors can prosecute for a much higher sentence. Id. This way, California authorities can prosecute large-
scale cultivators that fall slightly short of this federal requirement. See id. (requiring one-thousand plants for 
federal prosecution, which might conflict with state jurisdiction if the proposed state statute uses the same 
minimum quantity).  
277. E.g., Lindberg, supra note 64, at 59. 
278. E.g., Jessica Intrator et al., supra note 182, at 227 (2009) (stating that large-scale marijuana 
operations damage the environment and that cultivation on public land is becoming more prevalent). 
279. See Part IV.A (exploring the various ways that cultivation on public lands destroys natural habitat 
and wildlife). 
280. Id.  
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who cultivates five-hundred or more marijuana plants, regardless of the maturity 
of the plants, in a place that the person knew was public land, or reasonably 
should have known was public land, shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
state prison for two, three, or four years.”  
Because large-scale cultivators have grown far more than five-hundred 
plants,281 the statute should offer a higher sentence for extremely large numbers of 
plants. Based on a cost-benefit analysis,282 the statute should place a hefty cost on 
those seeking to reap substantial illegal gains. Thus, the statute should offer an 
even higher sentence for cultivators of one-thousand or more plants, such as a 
sentence of three, four, or five years. This system of sentencing enhancements by 
quantity of illegal drugs is consistent with other aspects of California drug law.283 
Section 11358(d) would read: “Every person who cultivates one-thousand or 
more marijuana plants, in a place that the person knew was public land, or 
reasonably should have known was public land, regardless of the maturity of the 
plants, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for three, four, or 
five years.”  
Overall, this proposed enhancement scheme would be consistent with the 
increased environmental damage that larger cultivation operations will inevitably 
cause. A graduated sentencing scheme will also raise potential cost with 
increased benefit, thereby lessening the incentives for growers.284 It will also 
protect California from environmental degradation while protecting the public 
from the public safety hazards of armed cultivators on public lands. 
This Comment proposes the following language for a new marijuana 
cultivation statute: 
(a)  Every person who plants, cultivates, harvests, dries, or processes any 
marijuana or any part thereof, except as otherwise provided by law, 
shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than 
one year or in the state prison or pursuant to subdivision (h) of 
section 1170 of the Penal Code. 
(b)  Every person who cultivates five-hundred or more marijuana plants 
on private land, regardless of the maturity of the plants, shall be 
punished by imprisonment in the state prison or pursuant to section 
1170(h) of the Penal Code. 
 
281. E.g., More Than 5,000 Pot Plants Seized in San Mateo Co., supra note 177 (discussing a single raid 
that turned up more than five-thousand plants). 
282. E.g., Landsburg, supra note 102 (stating that criminals weigh the potential cost of crime with the 
potential benefits that they may reap from the crime). 
283. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11370.4 (West 2007) (raising the penalties incrementally with 
the amount of specified drugs). 
284. See supra Part IV.B (describing how the current economic trends have led to increased production 
in order to reap the same profits). 
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(c)  Every person who cultivates five-hundred or more marijuana plants, 
in a place that the person knew was public land, or reasonably should 
have known was public land, regardless of the maturity of the plants, 
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, 
or four years. 
(d)  Every person who cultivates one-thousand or more marijuana plants, 
regardless of the maturity of the plants, in a place that the person 
knew was public land, or reasonably should have known was public 
land, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for three, 
four, or five years. 
This proposed statute would therefore take into account both the scale of the 
illegal cultivation and its location, offering a misdemeanor charge to lesser 
offenders, while requiring minimum sentences for cultivators who threaten public 
safety and contaminate California’s environment. The proposed statute should 
therefore facilitate a shift from large-scale cultivation to small-scale cultivation 
and from cultivation on public land to cultivation on private land. 
C. What Elements Could Be Changed 
There are several elements of the proposed statute that are approximations 
based on public policy goals. For instance, the numbers five-hundred and one-
thousand in the second and third subparts have no intrinsic significance,285 but 
represents a definite limit that was exceeded in the raids that CAMP conducted.286 
Mandating a specific number would help avoid any accusation that prosecutors 
were abusing their discretion, as there would be a mandatory minimum. On the 
other hand, it would then be possible for large-scale cultivators to plant just under 
five-hundred plants and avoid higher penalties. It is within the discretion of the 
legislature to determine whether five-hundred should be the limit or some other 
number, but the number should be high and definite. 
The legislature also has the discretion to define what constitutes public land. 
For instance, the legislature may determine that certain types of public land may 
be punishable by higher penalties or lower penalties, such as public camp 
grounds, state parks, or municipal land. As an example, in more remote areas, 
environmental degradation may be the main concern, while in others public 
safety may play a larger role. Thus, the proposed statute may single out specific 
areas with numerous tourists as well as wildlife that could receive greater 
protection, such as Yosemite National Park. While there is room for discussion, 
 
285. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006) (requiring at least one-thousand plants to prosecute). 
286. E.g., More Than 5,000 Pot Plants Seized in San Mateo Co., supra note 177 (discussing a single raid 
that turned up more than five-thousand plants). 
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the fact remains that the inflexibility of the unlawful cultivation statute does not 
reflect public opinion or legislative policy and it must be changed. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
California’s marijuana laws have been trending toward lenience since the 
CUA in 1996.287 Changing the cultivation statute to reflect this shift is the next 
step. At the same time, this Comment recognizes that California has been the site 
of rampant large-scale marijuana cultivation that has led to public safety hazards, 
degradation of the environment, and large expenditures in public tax money to 
regulate unlawful cultivation. 
The new statute employs a “carrot and stick” approach to marijuana law. By 
turning the cultivation statute into a wobbler, the state can offer lesser offenders a 
“carrot”—a guaranteed lower sentence. The result will be some combination of 
deterring unlawful cultivation through increased chances of successful 
prosecution and raising the effectiveness of conviction through plea bargains in 
cultivation cases. The “stick” of higher penalties for larger plantations and 
cultivating on public lands will result in some combination of deterring 
cultivators from planting large cultivation sites and deterring cultivators from 
using public lands. On balance, a wobbler cultivation statute with internal 
enhancements for major offenders will increase the number of successful 
marijuana cultivation prosecutions, contain public disappointment with the 
justice system, reduce the cost of large-scale marijuana eradication efforts, and 
protect California’s environment. 
 
 
287. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11362.5 (West 2007). 
